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ABSTRACT 
 
The accession talks with the European Union, which Croatia begun in October 
2005, have been described as an opportunity for a complete transformation of 
Croatian society. As of 2000, membership of the EU has been described as 
being of strategic importance, to be compared only with the 1992 international 
recognition of Croatia. Membership of the EU is seen as the end of ‘second 
transition’ (from nationalism and isolation of the 1990s to a modern, European 
state) and as an opportunity to increase a level of de facto sovereignty of the 
new state over its domestic affairs. Accordingly, in the last five years, the 
official narrative has been radically changed, whereas Tudjmanists have been 
marginalised. In addition, Croatian domestic politics has changed to become co-
operative with ethnic minorities. The article analyses this transformation by 
placing it in the context of the EU-Croatian relations.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
When on 4 October 2005, the European Union’s Council of Ministers agreed to begin 
accession talks with Croatia, the Croatian media compared this decision with 
international recognition of Croatia, which the European Union countries granted on 
15 January 1992. Both decisions were controversial, and caused serious divisions 
within the European Union. In 1992, it was Germany’s initiative that persuaded the 
then 12-member EU to recognise Croatia and Slovenia. Thirteen years later, Austria 
played a similar role when it conditioned its agreement to beginning of negotiations 
with Turkey with the same status for Croatia.  
 
The Croatian journey to the European Union has been long delayed, due primarily to 
reasons that were of Croatia’s own making. For the whole decade of the 1990s, 
Croatian politics was characterised by an authoritarian style of governance, promoted 
by President Franjo Tudjman (1990 – 1999) and his party, the Croatian Democratic 
Community (HDZ). The post-Yugoslav wars of 1991 – 1995 directly affected Croatia, 
which faced internal conflict with the breakaway region of Krajina (where ethnic 
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Serbs made up the majority of the population) and external attacks by Serbian and 
Montenegrin forces. In 1993-94, Croatia intervened unofficially, but no less 
forcefully, in the conflict between Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and was a long time supporter of the secessionist ambitions of the Croat 
Republic of Herceg-Bosna. The Dayton peace accord – of which the Croatian 
president Tudjman was a co-signatory – stopped the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
However, it was not before 1998 that the last segments of Croatian territory claimed 
by the secessionist Croatian Serbs (Eastern Slavonia near the border with Serbia, and 
Prevlaka on the Croatian border with Montenegro) were returned to Croatian control.  
 
While other East Central European states begun their accession to the European 
Union in the mid-1990s, Croatia was thus still resolving problems inherited from the 
violent collapse of the Yugoslav federation. In addition to this, however, the form of 
nationalism developed by Franjo Tudjman in the aftermath of the Dayton peace 
accord became hostile to the European Union and the idea of Europe. Unlike 
Slovenia, which moved quickly from its own isolationist type of nationalism of the 
early 1990s to a much more open liberal Europeanism, Croatia entrapped itself into an 
ideology that was rather suspicious of all supra-national organisations. Furthermore, 
Tudjman viewed himself as the winner of the post-Yugoslav wars, and felt secure 
enough to reject what he saw were the unfair demands that the European Union 
defined through the Regional Approach policy (as of April 1997). Tudjman criticised 
Europe for not helping Croatia when it was attacked in the post-Yugoslav wars, and 
for allegedly never being really supportive of Croatian independence. The Regional 
Approach, as well as the concept of the ‘Western Balkans’, were rejected in their 
entirety, as they were seen as an attempt to re-establish a neo-Yugoslavia. In response 
to the Regional Approach policies, Croatia under Tudjman amended its Constitution 
by adding an article that specifically prohibits membership of any association of states 
that could lead to a renewal of Yugoslavia, or a similar Balkan association of states.  
 
The European Union responded to this by freezing its relationship with Croatia. 
Croatia ended the decade of the 1990s in unofficial isolation, and with no formal 
agreements with the European Union. It was only after the death of Franjo Tudjman 
(in December 1999) and once his party lost parliamentary and presidential elections in 
early 2000, that Croatian policy saw an ideological and political about-turn with 
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regard to the idea of Europe. The Croatian journey to the European Union really only 
began in any meaningful sense in 2000. In the last five years, three governments (two 
led by Social-Democrat Ivica Račan, in 2000 – 2003, and the current government, 
which has since December 2003 been led by the leader of the reformed HDZ, Ivo 
Sanader) have made accession to the European Union their main strategic foreign 
policy objective. A radical change of foreign policy orientation, as well as the 
marginalisation of 'Tudjmanists' on the Croatian political scene, has resulted in the 
emergence of a political consensus between the major parties of both the government 
and the opposition. Mainstream Croatian politics is now largely defined by this 
consensus.  
 
This article focuses on this radical change of policy – between Tudjmanist scepticism 
and hostility towards the concept of Europe, and post-Tudjmanist pro-European 
narratives. I argue that the prospect of joining the European Union has already 
radically changed the character of Croatian politics in three major aspects. Firstly, it 
led to the defeat of isolationist nationalism, which characterised Croatian politics in 
the second half of the 1990s. Croatia no longer sees itself as a self-sufficient ‘regional 
power’ but as an integral part of a larger European project to which it wants to 
contribute. Secondly, the informal ‘grand coalition for Europe’ (in which now all 
major political parties participate) has successfully bridged the gaps between various 
ideological and ethnic segments of the Croatian population. For the first time since 
independence, Croatia is governed by a coalition which includes representatives of 
ethnic minorities, including the ethnic Serbs. At the same time, an unofficial ‘coalition 
for Europe’ closed the gap between former ideological adversaries – the reformed 
communists (SDP) and reformed nationalists (HDZ). Thirdly, the prospect of joining 
the European Union has fundamentally changed Croatian foreign policy orientation, 
which is now open to regional co-operation, including with countries such as Serbia 
and Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. All of this was unthinkable in the 1990s, 
when Croatia was engaged in wars with its neighbours and even with its own Serb 
minority.  
 
These changes in policy orientations were also reflected in personnel changes in the 
HDZ, in which the Tudjmanist forces have been successfully marginalised, while 
some of the most prominent politicians of the 1990s have left the party in protest. 
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Accession to the European Union is the main reason for these radical changes. 
Isolation from Europe is no longer seen as a viable option but as a road to decay. As 
explained by Hidajet Biščević, Croatian Deputy Foreign Minister: 
 
‘More than ten years have passed since we successfully ended the war. We must be 
aware that no society can develop if it freezes itself in a certain point in time, 
regardless of how important this point is for the history of that society. The world 
around us is changing fast. If we lag behind, we will find ourselves in isolation, and 
we will decay’.1  
 
Even more explicit was Vladimir Drobnjak, the Croatian Chief Negotiator with the 
EU. Speaking to the Croatian business elite on 17 October 2005, Drobnjak said:  
 
‘The point of negotiating with the European Union can be described as – the complete 
and full transformation of Croatian society. The EU accession means an increased 
standard of living, a stronger economy, and more opportunities for investment and 
new jobs being created day by day. By becoming a member of the Union, Croatia will 
enter the system of collective peace and security, and will participate in the process of 
decision-making.’2 
 
These four objectives (to make society more transparent and open; to strengthen the 
national economy and improve the standard of living; to enhance the level of security; 
and to increase political influence in European and in global affairs) have specific 
importance within the context of the recent history of conflicts in Croatia and its 
immediate neighbourhood.  
 
In the specific Croatian context, membership of the European Union is seen as the 
ultimate recognition that Croatia no longer represents an exception, but is a normal 
European state, equal in status and character to others. This is why membership of the 
European Union is now seen as a ‘second recognition’, and is compared to official 
                                                 
1
 ‘Put u EU je put ka napretku Hrvatske’, interview with Hidajet Biščević, Vjesnik, 15 October 2005. 
2
 ‘Drobnjak: pristupanje EU je hrvatski strateški cilj’, Croatian Radio Television News, 17 October 
2005. Accessible on 19 October 2005, at: http://vijesti.hrt.hr/ShowArticles.aspx?ArticleId=1357 . 
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recognition of independence in January 1992.3 While the first recognition was a 
formal acceptance of the fact that the Croatian state exists in terms of international 
law and international relations, this second recognition is seen as a confirmation of its 
democratic credentials. The Croatian political elite now accepts that in the context of 
liberal democratic Europe, only states with recognised democratic credentials are to 
be accepted as equal and trusted.  
 
Membership of the European Union is not only a matter of economic prospects and a 
guarantee of the enhanced level of security – it is the end of the transition period in 
which Croatia has been observed, advised and supervised – including through formal 
instruments and mechanisms, such as UN peace-keeping, OSCE election-observation, 
and the ICTY fact-discovering missions.4 Through membership of the European 
Union, Croatia hopes it will finally gain trust – at least to the degree other EU states 
are now trusted – after a long decade and a half in which it has often been treated with 
some suspicion. Its membership of the European Union will thus end the initial phase 
of, often largely, only nominal sovereignty. Thus, through membership of the EU 
Croatia aims to become a ‘proper’ (i.e. ‘sovereign’) state.5 The enthusiasm of Croatian 
political elites for Europe – and the transformation of former nationalists to pro-
Europeanists – is based on the expectation that membership in the Union will 
significantly enhance the level of actual sovereignty.  
 
This article will first describe the main elements of the Tudjmanist narrative on 
Europe in the second half of the 1990s. It will then focus on the new, post-Tudjmanist 
narrative and the dynamics of political change that followed parliamentary and 
presidential elections in 2000. The post-Tudjmanist period has had two distinctive 
                                                 
3
 This was explicitly stated by Hidajet Biščević, in his interview in Vjesnik, ibid. See also a statement 
by Vladimir Šeks, the President of Croatian Parliament as quoted by Hina News Agency, 7 October 
2005.  
4
 Since 1991, the following UN missions were hosted by Croatia: UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 
UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), UN Transitional Administration in 
Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), UN Police Support Group (UNPSG) and 
UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP). At the beginning of the war in 1991, the EU sent its 
European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM). The ICTY missions have been frequent since 1995. 
For the role of these missions, as well as for Croatian policy towards them, see Mario Nobilo: ‘Hrvatski 
Feniks’, Globus, Zagreb, 2000.  
5
 For similar link between ‘restitution of state independence, democracy and freedom’ and ‘full 
involvement in the European political and economic system, as well as the system of security and 
legislation’, see the Višegrad Declaration of 15 February 1991, signed by the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, Poland and Hungary. Accessible online on 1 November 2005, at www.visegradgroup.org. 
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phases: in the first the original enthusiasm of Ivica Račan’s government faced 
obstacles as early as in 2001, when two Croatian Army generals (Ante Gotovina and 
Janko Bobetko) were indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The opposition to these indictments provided the 
focal point for Tudjmanist forces to gather in order to stop the process of abandoning 
of Tudjmanist policies. In the second phase (following the 2003 elections), the 
Tudjmanist forces were undermined from within by the reformist strategies of the new 
HDZ leader, Ivo Sanader. This was a very significant step, as it deprived the 
Tudjmanists of their ‘natural home’, leaving them without influence in the strongest 
political party in the country. The European Union responded in kind, recognising 
Croatia’s candidate status in June 2004, and opening accession talks in October 2005.  
 
 
Tudjman’s views on Europe in the second half of the 1990s 
 
The powerful incentive of transforming what was largely nominal sovereignty into a 
more substantive sovereignty remains an important reason why many former 
supporters of Croatian independence now support membership of the European 
Union. Although Tudjman secured independence in nominal terms, and achieved the 
territorial integrity of the new Croatian state, his nationalism in the second half of the 
1990s led Croatia into isolation in which the important elements of sovereignty had 
been de facto lost. In domestic politics, Croatian sovereignty was challenged by the 
existence of the ICTY, which indicted several members of Tudjman’s military elite, 
and even confirmed that it investigated Tudjman in the last years of his life.6 The 
obligation to co-operate with the ICTY forced Croatia to make an exception with 
regard to the constitutional ban on the extradition of Croatian nationals to any courts 
outside the country.7 This Croatian foreign policy position was weak, and in the 
second half of the 1990s the country was under undeclared (silent) sanctions. The EU-
Croatian relationship worsened after April 1997, when the EU introduced the 
Regional Approach policy for countries of the Western Balkans. The very concept of 
the ‘Western Balkans’ was  unacceptable to Croatia, as it linked the country with its 
                                                                                                                                            
 
6
 For this see Novi List, 28 June 2002, accessible online on 23 October 2005 at www.novilist.hr 
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former Yugoslav neighbours and Albania, rather than with East Central European 
states, which had begun accession talks with the EU. Tudjman’s radical nationalism 
led Croatia from Yugoslavia, but it now threatened to take it back to the ‘Western 
Balkans’, and not – as initially promised – to the European Union. Tudjman angrily 
responded to the concept of Western Balkans, seeing it as evidence of Europe’s 
hostility towards Croatia. Even those once close to him now began to question the 
future of Croatian independence if it was to remain forever linked with the politics of 
the Balkans. In response to what he saw as a threat to Croatian sovereignty, the 
Croatian President initiated an amendment to Croatian Constitution, which now 
included the new article (141), stating:  
 
“It is prohibited to initiate any process of association of the Republic of Croatia with 
other states, if such an association would or could lead to restoration of Yugoslav state 
community or any new Balkan state union in any form.” 
 
In the initial phase of seeking recognition for the independent Croatian state (in 1991-
1992), the official Croatian narrative insisted that Croatia was a European country, 
and thus a part of the larger European project. However, by the mid-1990s Tudjman 
had turned hostile towards Europe and criticised its failure to assist Croatia on its road 
from ‘the Balkans’ to ‘Europe’. In the years when other East and Central European 
countries were negotiating conditions for accession to European Union, Tudjman 
accused Europe of not being supportive of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, and of 
being vindictive towards Croatia, in effect punishing it for the role it played in 
destruction of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, Tudjman argued, was the ‘darling of the 
West’, and ‘a promising project’ in the eyes of many in Europe. Europe wanted to 
save it for far too long – and thus it imposed sanctions against all Yugoslav republics, 
including Croatia when it was attacked, hoping that the Yugoslav Army would have 
crushed it. In one of his most controversial speeches, on 6 December 1996, Tudjman 
said: 
 
‘All international factors – from London, Paris and Rome to Bonn and Washington, 
and, of course, Moscow – favoured, cost what it may, the maintenance of the former 
                                                                                                                                            
7
 This was done through a separate Constitutional Law on Co-operation with the ICTY, which was 
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Yugoslavia as the cornerstone of the Versailles order in this part of Europe. When all 
the political-diplomatic efforts to keep up Yugoslavia failed, the very same circles 
considered that independent Croatia could not survive, jeopardized as it was by the 
organized revolt of the Serb population in Croatia and the immense military 
supremacy of the Yugocommunist army. All the European powers, together with the 
entire European Community and America and the United Nations, not only 
impassively watched the Yugocommunist and Serbian forces barbarically destroy 
Vukovar and other Croatian cities in the autumn of 1991, but even enacted the arms 
embargo in the Security Council. This meant nothing else but leaving barehanded, 
helpless Croatia at the mercy of the superiority of the Yugoslav Army, then 
considered to be one of the strongest military powers in Europe.’8  
 
 
According to Tudjman’s interpretation, Croatia politically defeated Europe by 
surviving the war as an independent state. Croatia therefore represents a ‘an untidy 
area in the European conscience’, one that Europe is reluctant to face. In Tudjman’s 
words, this was the essence of Croatia’s problems with Europe, and of Europe’s with 
Croatia. In addition, Croatia was the main reason for the failure of European policy in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995. It was only because of the close links and co-operation 
between Croatia and the United States that the American concept (as formulated by 
the Dayton Peace Accord) prevailed – a fact that Europeans would never forget.9 In 
Tudjman’s interpretation, the proposal for regional co-operation within the ‘Western 
Balkans’ (the concept which Croatian officials always used in inverted commas, or 
with words ‘so called’ in front) was Europe’s angry response to this alliance between 
the US and Croatia. The purpose of it was – to take Croatia (and other former 
Yugoslav states, with the possible exception of Slovenia) back to the Balkan 
framework from which it had just escaped. Europe forgets, Tudjman argued, that in 
historical terms the ‘Balkan episode’ was just a very short one, when compared to 
Croatia’s belonging to the West (i.e. Austro-Hungarian/Central European cultural and 
                                                                                                                                            
enacted on 19 April 1996.  
8
 See: ‘Topical issues related to the development of Croatia in given international circumstances’. 
Available on 9 December 1996 at the Official Website of the President of the Republic of Croatia at: 
http://www.predsjednik.hr/speechdz.htm. 
9
 This point was made in several speeches and press conferences in 1996 and 1997. See, for example, 
Tudjman’s interview with the editors-in-chief of Croatian media on 22 October 1996. 
www.predsjednik.hr/iv-2210.html (available on 19 November 1996). 
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political structure) for centuries.10 With the end of any chance for Yugoslavia to be re-
established, Croatia ended its ‘Balkan episode’ – but is now not allowed to join 
Europe. This is not only unfair – but, Tudjman argued, hypocritical. In response to 
European criticisms of the massive expulsion of ethnic Serbs from the region of 
Krajina in 1995, Tudjman became hostile to Europe and to some of its leading 
nations: 
 
‘Some European states dare to teach us lessons on how to treat minorities. They have 
forgotten that a democratic France, for example, does not even recognise the existence 
of minorities on its soil. Or, they urge us that we must return all Serbs who fled 
Croatia during the war back to Croatia, but they forget that they could not solve 
problems like that between Czech Republic and Germany, etc.’11  
 
By being unfair, acting from a position of might, not principles, the EU – Tudjman 
argued - often treated Croatia as a ‘small nation’, an unimportant factor in 
international politics, which could be commanded at the will of the great powers. 
Tudjman’s rhetoric against Europe now became increasingly similar to the one he 
used to use against the former Yugoslavia, i.e. ‘Belgrade’. In the official dictionary of 
Croatian politics of the second half of the 1990s,  ‘Europe’ replaced ‘Yugoslavia’, 
while ‘Brussels’ replaced ‘Belgrade’ as the Unprincipled Other, the one that cannot 
come to terms with the existence and sovereignty of the Croatian state. Europe was 
now a new ‘artificial creation’, a project based on the unrealistic idealism of its 
visionaries, on unworkable principles of multi-national ‘federations’ – and not on the 
ethnic unity of its population and shared memories. The areas of conflict in this new 
Europe are to be more-or-less the same as those in the former Yugoslavia: consensus 
vs. ‘majoritarisation’, nation-state vs. loose union of sovereign states, confederalism 
vs. federalism, right to opt out vs. compulsory subordination to a distant centre of 
power. In addition to this, Tudjman argued, Europe is based on an illusion that a new 
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 Detailed analysis of Tudjman’s political discourses is offered in: Gordana Uzelac (1997): ‘Franjo 
Tudjman’s nationalist ideology’, East European quarterly, Vol 31, No 4, pp. 449-72. See also: Alex 
Bellamy (2003): ‘The Formation of Croatian National Identity: A centuries-old dream?’, Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
11
 ‘Interview Predsjednika Republike dr Franje Tudjmana glavnim i odgovornim urednicima hrvatskih 
javnih glasila, 22 listopada 1996 u Predsjedničkim dvorima’ (an Interview to editors-in-chiefs of the 
Croatian media), available at the Official Site of the President of the Republic of Croatia, on 19 
November 1996. Http://www.predsjednik.hr/iv-2210.htm. 
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European culture will emerge and that it will successfully replace the existing small 
identities. This will not happen – the historical, religious and recent ideological 
differences were here to stay. The bloody collapse of Yugoslavia (which was united 
by a much more coherent ideology and more ethno-historical similarities than the new 
Europe) should teach us a lesson – that these differences should not be neglected. 
They will ultimately, Tudjmanists believed, make any new federal Europe as unlikely 
as it was the case with a federal Yugoslavia.12 
 
In general, such rhetoric was not unpopular in Croatia, as was evident from electoral 
successes of Tudjman’s HDZ at all parliamentary elections in the 1990s. There are 
several reasons for this. Firstly, Croatia was a new state, which for the first four years 
of its existence suffered severe internal and inter-state military conflicts on its own 
territory. A belief that Europe had indeed failed to prevent or stop the conflict was 
widespread – not only in Croatia but elsewhere too. Europe’s hesitant interventions 
cast a shadow of deep doubt over its ability and/or willingness to act. Secondly, the 
war further radicalised those who participated in it – Croats and Serbs alike. 
Nationalism – being originally less than strong in the last years of Yugoslavia13 – 
emerged quickly and grew more extreme with each day of the conflict. Tudjman’s 
rhetoric against the ‘arrogant Europe’, in defence of a small, newly independent 
Croatian state, became rather popular with Croatian nationalists and many others. This 
narrative offered a new Other, when in the immediate aftermath of the 1995 victories 
of the Croatian Army against the breakaway Krajina region the old Other 
(Yugoslavia, Serbs, Belgrade) ceased to be seen as serious threat. Finally, Croatian 
nationalism needed constitutive myths – and the ‘Homeland War’ (as Tudjman called 
the conflicts of the first half of the 1990s) was now to be transformed into one of 
them. Tudjman’s interpretation of Croatia fighting the mighty neighbours and defying 
Europe at the same time made grounds for a new myth of martyrium.14 Croatia 
survived the war, despite being left ‘barehanded, helpless at the mercy of the 
                                                 
12
 For details on Tudjman’s predictions of the future failure of Europe, see his book: ‘Nacionalno 
pitanje u suvremenoj Europi’ (National Question in Contemporary Europe) (1989, reprinted 1996), 
Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Matice Hrvatske.  
13
 In this I agree with recent analysis by V.P. Gagnon Jr., offered in his (2004) book: ‘The Myth of 
Ethnic War’, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. See also my own (2003) analysis in: 
‘Jugoslavija – država koja je odumrla’ (Yugoslavia – a State that Withered Away), published in Zagreb 
and Belgrade by Prometej and Samizdat B92 respectively.  
14
 See Pal Kolsto’s classification of constitutive myths, in the introductory chapter in his edited volume 
‘Myths and Boundaries in South-Eastern Europe’, London: Hurst and Company, 2005, pp 1-34.  
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superiority of the Yugoslav Army, then considered to be one of the strongest military 
powers in Europe’, he said on 6 November 1996 – it has survived because it has 
‘mustered amazing stamina and maturity with which it has alone, by virtue of its own 
strength and only with God’s help – won its place in the international order’ – it will 
therefore be able to survive on its own in future too. 15 
 
This rhetoric of self-sufficiency, reminded many of Josip Broz Tito and his years of 
balancing ‘on his own’, between East and West in the Cold-War years.16 Tudjman’s 
Titoist background (in years before 1967) only helped him to style himself as a ‘new 
Tito’17, the one who can secure the stability and well-being of his country by playing 
the great powers against each other. The balance he attempted to create between US, 
EU and Russia’s influence in the Balkans (and even in Croatia) reminded many of 
Titoist foreign policy of ‘No’ to Soviets and ‘No’ to Americans.18 His message to the 
outer world in one of his last interviews, on 1 July 1999, indeed sounded very Titoist, 
at least in its second half: 
 
‘We do not want to join any type of Balkan integration process and we refuse to be 
anyone’s puppets!’19 
 
However, while Tito’s Yugoslavia indeed was a strong international factor and the 
key country of the Balkans for more than 40 years, Tudjman’s Croatia was in a very 
different position. While Tito created international institutions (such as the non-
aligned association of states in 1961), Tudjman was deeply distrustful of new 
institutions and ideas. While Tito favoured multi-ethnic federation of semi-
autonomous nation-states, Tudjman was a believer in the Croatian nation-state, which 
would be dominated by ethnic Croats, with little place for minorities. When all this is 
                                                 
15
 See Tudjman’s speech of 6 November 1996: ‘Topical issues related to the development of Croatia in 
given international circumstances’. Available on 9 December 1996 at the Official Website of the 
President of the Republic of Croatia at: http://www.predsjednik.hr/speechdz.htm. 
16
 For Tudjman’s very positive assessment of Tito’s historical role and achievements, see Ivica Radoš 
(2005): ‘Tudjman izbliza’, Zagreb: Profil.  
17
 Slobodan Milošević had the same perception of himself back in 1986-1989. See Slavoljub ðukić 
(2001): ‘Milošević and Marković: A Lust for Power’, Montreal and London: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press’, and Lenard Cohen (2001): ‘Serpent in the Bosom: the rise and fall of Slobodan 
Milošević’, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.  
18
 For Tudjman’s attempts to make alliances with Russia and China during the second half of the 
1990s, see Mario Nobilo (ibid),  
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added to his lack of understanding of cultural and political diversities in modern 
societies, it was not surprising that by the end of his period Tudjman presided over an 
increasingly isolated country, which was more often compared to Serbia than with its 
Central European neighbours. Paradoxically, it was in fact Tudjmanist policy that 
ultimately distanced Croatia from Europe and placed it firmly back in the ‘Balkans’, 
in a political sense.  
 
 
Post-Tudjmanist discourses 
 
Tudjmanist discourse dictated Croatia’s domestic and foreign policy throughout the 
1990s. In the second half of the decade it led to isolation from others, especially from 
the European Union. Even more significantly – at least for Tudjman’s own supporters 
– this isolation led to increasing outside intrusion in the domestic affairs of the new 
Croatian state. For example, the Council of Europe imposed no less than 22 
conditions for Croatian membership before finally admitting Croatia to its 
membership on 6 November 1996 (almost five years after the international 
recognition). From the point of view of official Croatia even more painful was the 
ambition of the ICTY (which was formed in 1995) to claim jurisdiction over the 
Croatian military – related to police actions ‘Flash’ and ‘Storm’ in Krajina. Tudjman 
refused to co-operate with the Tribunal over these actions, which were now becoming 
the core elements of the state-built myth of the ‘Homeland War’. By 1999, the ICTY 
lost patience, and officially requested that the UN Security Council impose sanctions 
on Croatia for non-compliance with the Tribunal.20 It was only when Croatia 
extradited the first of the accused (Mladen Naletilić Tuta) that the threat of sanctions 
was removed – but the anymosity between Tudjman and the ICTY was far from over.   
 
At the same time, the discontent with Tudjman’s increasingly autocratic style of 
governance was growing in Croatia too – especially in urban centres, including the 
capital Zagreb. In 1996, President Tudjman refused to recognise  the results of local 
elections in Zagreb and imposed his own appointee as temporary mayor. When he 
                                                                                                                                            
19
 Interview with Croatia Weekly, as quoted in William Bartlett (2002): ‘Croatia: Between Europe and 
the Balkans’, London: Routledge, p.63. 
20
 Bartlett, ibid., p 80. 
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tried to silence a popular urban Radio 101, he faced massive public protests in Zagreb 
– not unlike those in Belgrade against Slobodan Milošević throughout the decade. 
While other East Central European countries – including the neighbouring Slovenia 
and Hungary – were now officially applying for membership in the European Union, 
Croatia looked more similar to Serbia than to the new democracies in its 
neighbourghood. Tudjman personally was still popular, but this was largely due to 
respect for his role during the first half of the 1990s, in which he led the country 
towards independence and stood at its helm during the war. By 1997 it was already 
obvious that he suffered from terminal illness – which in fact only further discouraged 
the opposition forces from attacking his policies. Rather than taking risks by openly 
challenging his policy, they decided to prepare for the post-Tudjmanist era.  
 
On 3 January 2000, only three weeks after Tudjman’s death, his party lost 
parliamentary elections to a coalition of anti-Tudjmanist forces, which consisted of 
six parties and was led by the Social-Democrats (SDP) and Social-Liberals (HSLS).21 
The coalition won convincingly: it controlled a majority of 95 seats to HDZ’s 46. 
Even more directly, the HDZ’s candidate Mate Granić came only third in the first 
round of presidential elections on 24 January 2000, having won only 22  per cent  of 
the votes. The elections were won by Stjepan Mesić, the former Prime Minister and 
Croatia’s representative in Presidency of the Yugoslav Federation (1990-1991), who 
in 1994 left the HDZ in protest against  Tudjman’s autocracy and Croatian 
involvement in the war against Bosnian government forces. The anti-Tudjmanist 
coalition (and even more so the new President) had a very different vision of Europe 
than that of their predecessors.  
 
The new narrative was based on the notion that isolation was neither desirable nor 
viable in the long-term. In order to survive as a state, Croatia must join European 
institutions. If it remained outside, it could risk economic, cultural, and political 
regression, which would then, ultimately, lead to a permanent sense of insecurity, 
                                                 
21
 The ‘Coalition of Six’ was an anti-Tudjmanist coalition, in which participated: the Social-
Democratic party of Croatia (SDP), Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian Peasant Party 
(HSS), Croatian People’s Party (HNS), Liberal Party (LS) and Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS). In 
2001, the IDS decided to withdraw from the Coalition, although it continued to support it in 
Parliament. In July 2002, the HSLS withdrew from the government, and joined the HDZ-led 
opposition, thus reducing the coalition to its four ‘core’ members. SDP, HSS, HNS and LS.  
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including the fear of being defenceless. Serbia was a great example of what was likely 
to happen to a state which refused to accept that there were limits to its power. 
Isolation and even worse was the price that was paid for this illusion of self-
sufficiency, which was based on an unrealistic perception of Serbia’s greatness. 
Croatia – which Tudjman had turned into the ‘twin sister’ of Milošević’s Serbia – had 
by then learnt a lesson. NATO bombs, aimed at targets in Belgrade during the Kosovo 
operation in Spring and early Summer of 1999 - hit Croatian political scene too.  
 
The new discourse was pro-European, and much more realistic with respect to the 
place of Croatia within structures of the enlarged European Union and (eventually) of 
the enlarged NATO. Instead of competing with Belgrade over Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and for domination in the region, Croatia re-directed its foreign policy interests 
towards the West. For the first time since independence, Croatia made it clear that it 
wanted to play a constructive role in its own region – and has changed radically its 
policy towards neighbouring countries. In Bosnia, Croatia began to follow the 
European line of action, by supporting international institutions, rather than ethnic 
Croats and their nationalist party, the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Zagreb also 
supported democratic changes in Serbia, following the demise of Slobodan Milošević 
from power on 5 October 2000. Relations between two countries quickly improved, 
and visas were suspended on both sides in 2002. Under the umbrella of preparation 
for NATO-membership, Croatia co-operated with Macedonia and Albania. The new 
narrative was no longer hostile to Southeast Europe, and Croatia publicly supports the 
prospective accession of all countries in the region to the European Union.   
 
At the same time, Croatia no longer aspires to be the ‘regional power’. It does not 
compete with Serbia for ‘spheres of interest’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It no longer 
declares itself as having a ‘historical role’ to bring Bosnia-Herzegovina to Europe, 
and of ‘Europeanizing’ its south-eastern neighbours. It no longer thinks of itself in 
terms of military, political and economic self-sufficiency. The idea that Croatia could 
remain at an equal distance between the West and the (non-existing) East – which was 
kept alive by Tudjman’s contacts with the USSR/Russia in his years of power - have 
now been replaced by a clearly pro-European policy, in which Russia plays no major 
role. Croatia wants to be a ‘normal country’, and not an exception to the general trend 
of Europeanisation in the former Eastern Europe.  
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This change affects not only Croatian foreign policy, but it also influences the core 
definition of political identity of the new Croatian state. While this identity was in the 
Tudjman period structured primarily in opposition to Others (Serbia, Yugoslavia, 
Bosnian Muslims, Europe, local Serbs, former Communists, et al.) it is now more than 
ever created around its own ‘positive’ definition. Looking inward, towards itself, 
rather than to ‘hostile Others’ in its neighbourhood, post-Tudjmanist Croatia 
discovered that it is, indeed, a small state. Subsequently, Croatia also discovered that 
in order to safeguard its existence, it must integrate with global and regional military 
and political structures. There is a new awareness that the Tudjmanist narrative of 
‘regional power’ had in fact placed Croatia in a much less favourable situation than 
any other Central European state. Co-operation, and not conflict, with others became 
the priority objective of Croatian foreign policy. After the elections in 2000, Croatia 
gave the impression that it wanted to move quickly – in order to compensate for the 
time lost during the long decade of the 1990s.  
 
EU and NATO initially responded with enthusiasm, welcoming political changes that 
they believed would contribute to lasting stability in South Eastern Europe. On 25 
May 2000 Croatia became a member of the Partnership for Peace initiative, with a 
view to joining the NATO at a later stage. At the same time, the European Union 
warmly welcomed political changes in Zagreb, not least because it hoped that changes 
in Zagreb would further strengthen the anti-Milošević opposition in Belgrade. On the 
eve of becoming a member of the Partnership for Peace, the Secretary General of 
NATO, George Robertson, said that this membership was a signal ‘to the people of 
Serbia… that Croatia is proof that a country does not have to remain a victim of 
history’.22 The European Union’s foreign and defence policy chief, Javier Solana, 
noted the ‘outstanding significance of Croatia’s political changes and their positive 
impact on Bosnia-Herzegovina’s prospects’.23 These changes were now seen as a 
break-through success in the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans, which as of 
June 1999 was structured around the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe initiative. It 
                                                 
22
 Patrick FitzPatrick: ‘News from Croatia’, Central European Review, accessible online on 21 October 
2005, at: www.ce-review.org.  
23
 Patrick FitzPatrick, ibid. 
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was now time for further pressure against Milošević. This pressure from inside and 
from abroad resulted in his removal on 5 October 2000.  
 
However, with the end of the Milošević regime in Belgrade the issue of regional co-
operation within the Western Balkans resurfaced. The new Croatian government was 
much more receptive to the idea of regional co-operation, but there still existed strong 
opposition to this idea. The new Prime Minister, Ivica Račan, explained the 
difficulties in implementing his new policy in the face of this opposition:  
 
‘For me personally, and for the government, there are no problems regarding regional 
co-operation. However, the other thing is that we still have to explain certain issues 
and we still have to take into account the fears which are based on our experience of 
being a part of some other associations up until recently, and which have not ended 
happily. I have in mind our recent history. But – as I said – my government fully 
understands that it has to accept European criteria if it wants to be a part of Europe. 
And European criteria – that means: co-operation with neighbours, with the region. I 
cannot imagine a stable Croatia without stability of our neighbours.’24  
 
Based on this new policy, Croatia hosted the Zagreb Summit of EU heads of state and 
government with their counterparts in five states of the Western Balkans on 24 
November 2000, and signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU 
on 29 October 2001. The Tudjmanist opposition, together with various groups of 
veterans of the ‘Homeland War’ strongly objected to both the Summit and the 
Agreement, arguing that this was clear evidence of Croatia’s ‘return to the Balkans’. 
Opposition to the new course of Croatian foreign policy continued to find a voice 
through some parts of the media, and also within the HDZ until the parliamentary 
elections in November 2003. Most significantly, important segments of the 
administration – such as the intelligence services, police, judiciary and even the Army 
– remained largely unreformed in these first three years since the policy change. 
Although they could not stop the new policy, the Tudjmanists significantly slowed 
down its implementation. This was especially the case with regard to return of the 
ethnic Serb refugees to areas where they lived before 1995, and to co-operation with 
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the ICTY, which remained slow and incomplete. The difficulties that confronted the 
new government were further intensified owing to the emergence of the first 
disagreements within the anti-Tudjmanist coalition. Differences over the issue of co-
operation with the ICTY, as well as over the relationship with Slovenia, resulted in 
the resignation of the first Račan cabinet in July 2002. The crisis was provoked by the 
second-largest coalition partner, the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) which 
moved further towards a neo-Tudjmanist position as part of a strategy to attract the 
votes of the disillusioned former supporters of the HDZ. The second Račan 
government was a coalition of four parties – without the HSLS. But the disputes over 
the speed of reforms continued – this time largely between Račan’s SDP and the more 
conservative Croatian Peasant Party (HSS).  
 
However, the most serious challenge for the new government and President Mesić 
came however in form of the indictment of two former generals of the Croatian Army 
– Ante Gotovina (indicted on 8 June 2001) and Janko Bobetko (indicted on 23 August 
2002). Soon after the indictments were made public, these two cases became a focal 
point for unification of all Tudjmanist forces (including the strongest party in 
opposition, the HDZ). These generals were key figures in the ‘Homeland War’ – 
Bobetko as the Chief-of-Staff of the Croatian Army, and Gotovina as the Commander 
of the Split Military District, directly responsible for operations in and around Knin. 
Prior to the indictment, Bobetko was retired, while Gotovina was dismissed by 
President Mesić (on 29 October 2000) along with eleven other generals who had 
actively opposed political changes following the January 2000 elections.  
 
Faced with massive public protests and blocked by internal divisions between 
coalition partners, the government failed to act quickly, and thus enabled both 
generals to avoid extradition. It was reported that Gotovina had gone into hiding on 14 
July 2001.25 In November 2001, the Croatian government officially informed the 
ICTY that they were not in a position to arrest him.26 The ICTY immediately accused 
the Račan cabinet of allowing Gotovina to escape arrest. In her statement of 27 July 
2001, Florence Hartman, the ICTY spokesperson, said that the Croatian government 
                                                                                                                                            
24
 Ivica Račan, interview to RFE, 19 December 2000, accessible online on 21 October 2005, at : 
www.danas.org.  
25
 Vjesnik, 14 July 2001.  
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received the indictment on 12 June 2001, but failed to arrest the general immediately. 
For the ICTY, ‘the government was responsible for failing to arrest Gotovina.’ 
 
In addition, the case of General Bobetko led to further doubts surrounding the 
readiness (and perhaps even willingness) of the Račan cabinet to co-operate with the 
ICTY. Bobetko had been the most senior military person in the country, a veteran 
Partisan fighter during the Second World War, and was the founder of the Croatian 
Army in 1991. Both Prime Minister Račan and the HSS leader Zlatko Tomčić praised 
Bobetko for his role in the war, and had promised that he would not be extradited.27 
The Croatian government actually contested the indictment as unlawful, but the ICTY 
rejected the appeal on 29 November 2002.28 President Mesić insisted on full co-
operation with the ICTY, including in the Bobetko case. His statement of 26 
September 2002 made him the target of organised Tudjmanist opposition, which for 
the first time threatened the use of violence in its protest against the new course in 
Croatian policy. However, in the new, post-Tudjmanist Croatia the role of the 
President was reduced to a near-ceremonial one, with no real decision-making power 
in this type of issue. The difference between the government and the President further 
encouraged the Tudjmanists, some of whom armed themselves claiming they would 
use weapons to protect Bobetko.29 With the ICTY indictment of Gotovina and 
Bobetko, Croatia faced the most delicate moment since the end of the war in 1995.  
 
The initial hesitation of the Croatian government shown by the failure to arrest these 
two generals was in sharp contrast with the quick and decisive extradition of Slobodan 
Milošević by the government of Serbia on 28 June 2001. All of this contributed to 
suspicions again being voiced, and a questioning of whether Croatian politics had 
really changed. This was reflected in the immediate reactions of the US and the EU. 
Already in October 2002, the US suspended financial assistance for judicial reforms 
to Croatia, while on 15 October 2002 the UK suspended ratification of the 
                                                                                                                                            
26
 B 92 News, 27 July 2001, accessible online on 21 October 2005 at www.b92.net.  
27
 B 92 News,21 and 23 September 2002, ibid.   
28
 B 92 News, 29 November 2002 , ibid.  
29
 For rumours that a coup d’etat was planned in these days see Politika, 25 September 2002. As the 
assassination of Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran ðinñić, in March 2003, illustrated, the use of violence 
against reformers was a real possibility which could not be easily dismissed as an empty threat. 
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Stabilisation and Association Agreement on the grounds of Croatia’s failure to 
extradite general Bobetko.30  
 
Bobetko died in his home in Zagreb (without ever being extradited) in May 2003, but 
the Gotovina case remained one of the main obstacles to Croatia’s accession to the 
European Union and NATO until his arrest in Spain on 8 December 2005. This case 
caused a long delay in ratification of the Stabilization and Association Agreement that 
Croatia signed on 29 October 2001, and which entered into force only on 1 February 
2005, after the ongoing refusal of the United Kingdom and the Netherlands to ratify it 
in their respective parliaments. It also caused a delay to Croatian prospects of 
becoming a member of NATO. Ever since 2001, US officials have continued to state 
firmly that only when general Gotovina is arrested and extradited could Croatia be 
considered for membership of NATO.31 The Gotovina case is important not only 
because of Ante Gotovina, but as a test for the level of de-Tudjmanisation in Croatia. 
A failure to act quickly in 2001 – and even more the protection of general Bobetko in 
2002 – were taken as signs that Croatia had not yet completed ‘the full transformation 
of society’ from its Tudjmanist recent past.  
 
The first three years since the change of regime were, in this respect, a mixture of 
successes and failures. Račan’s government and (even more) President Mesić changed 
the official rhetoric and the direction of Croatian domestic and foreign policy. But 
soon after the elections they were seen as somewhat hesitant, weak and divided. The 
ICTY indictment of Gotovina came perhaps too soon, and it did not help to 
consolidate the new government. President Mesić was much more determined to act, 
but his powers were reduced to near-ceremonial by constitutional changes enacted by 
the new Parliament. In addition, as the indictments were seen as pressure from abroad, 
the Tudjmanists were quick to point out that President Tudjman had firmly stood his 
ground against such pressures. Tudjmanists were indeed gaining strength from a 
situation that they interpreted as an example of disrespect for Croatian sovereignty. 
The reformers were not helped by the fact that the accused were two generals – their 
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 Beta News, 15 October 2001, accessible online on 21 October 2005 at www.b92.net. 
31
 Before the arrest of Ante Gotovina, this was the US official position, as expressed by the US 
Assistant Secretary of State, Nicholas Burns, on 7 October 2005. See Hina News Agency, 7 October 
2005, accessible online at: www.hina.hr. 
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arrest carried the potential of antagonising the Army and possibly also the Police – 
still largely made up of Tudjmanists.  
 
The internal disputes, differences with President Mesić, further stalemate on issue of 
EU and NATO membership, and the dissapointment with results achieved in almost 
four years of Račan’s two governments significantly contributed to HDZ’s victory in 
the November 2003 elections.  
 
 
Croatia after the 2003 elections 
 
The election victory of the HDZ was originally viewed by many as a serious setback 
for the Croatian pro-European policy. The Račan government officially applied for 
full membership of the European Union on 21 February 2003, and in June 2003 it 
submitted responses to standard EU accession questionnaire. This took place in a 
situation where the Stabilization and Association Agreement had not yet been ratified 
by the Netherlands and the UK. In these circumstances, the victory of the political 
party which openly opposed the ICTY indictments of Gotovina and Bobetko was seen 
as a further problem.  
 
But, to the surprise of many in Croatia, and in the international community, the new 
Prime Minister, Ivo Sanader, moved quickly to affirm his commitment to full 
cooperation with the ICTY. In addition, he confirmed that EU membership continues 
to be the priority objective of Croatian policy under his government. In his first 
interview with the foreign press following the elections, he said:  
 
‘We are now a reformed, democratic, centre-right party. We are no longer a 
Tudjmanist party, although we are grateful to the former head of state for what he did 
for Croatian independence’.32  
 
                                                 
32
 Interview to Der Spiegel, as quoted by Tanjug News Agency on 30 November 2003. Accessible 
online on 21 October 2005 at www.b92.net. 
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By making reference only to Tudjman’s success in achieving independence for 
Croatia – and by avoiding praise for achievements in the decade of his rule since – 
Sanader presented himself as a reformer from within the HDZ. This was confirmed by 
his choice of coalition partners. Instead of relying on the far-right Croatian Party of 
Rights (HSP), he chose to make a coalition with the HSLS (a former partner in 
Račan’s first government) and – more significantly – with the representatives of 
ethnic minorities in Croatian parliament, including the Independent Democratic Serb 
Party (SDSS). This was a radical departure from the Tudjmanist policy of 
marginalising and discriminating against minorities, particularly the ethnic Serbs. In 
fact, it was also an improvement on policy of the Račan governments, which had not 
included ethnic minority representatives, perhaps fearing that this would only 
encourage Tudjmanist opposition who would interpret it as further evidence of a 
‘return to Yugoslavia’. Another possible reason for Račan’s lack of interest in ethnic 
Serb parties can be seen in the competing electoral strategies of the parties in the 
Croatian party system. Račan’s SDP was in direct competition with the SDSS for the 
votes of ethnic Serbs.  
 
Thus, it was to the surprise of many when, on 19 December 2003, the SDSS signed a 
coalition agreement with the HDZ. Sanader’s government promised to facilitate return 
of Serb refugees, and the restitution of their property, including the once state-owned 
flats in which they had the right of permanent tenancy. The SDSS was offered several 
senior posts in the administration, although it refused the HDZ’s offer of one or two 
ministerial positions. Subsequent to this agreement, Ivo Sanader invited all refugees to 
return to Croatia, stating that the Serbs had no reason to fear the new, HDZ-led 
government. In one of his first public functions following the elections, the new Prime 
Minister attended the Orthodox Christmas reception party in the premises of the Serb 
National Council in Zagreb, where he said that ‘the Serb minority, just as any other 
minority, enriches Croatia and thus should be treasured’.33 This symbolic gesture – 
followed by Sanader’s visit to the site of the Second World War Jasenovac 
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 See reports by Tanjug News Agency, 25 December 2003, Srna News Agency, 4 January 2004, and 
by B 92, 6 January 2004. Ibid.  
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concentration camp in which tens of thousands of Serbs were murdered34 - was 
welcomed by ethnic Serbs in Croatia, but it was also well received in Serbia.  
 
The new government continued to promote regional co-operation as a key Croatian 
foreign policy objective. Serb-Croat political co-operation in Croatia facilitated 
further rapprochement between the governments of Croatia and Serbia and 
Montenegro (as the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been known as of 
March 2003). The bilateral relationship intensified in 2004, with first official visit to 
Zagreb of Svetozar Marović, the president of Serbia and Montenegro (25 May 2004), 
and the first visit by the Croatian Prime Minister to Belgrade after the war (15 
November 2004). Sanader said that ‘full stabilization in Southeast Europe’ is one of 
the main objectives of his government.35 In November 2004 the two states signed a 
bilateral agreement covering the protection of minorities.36 In August 2004, one of the 
leaders of the Serb minority in Croatia, Milorad Pupovac, said that the Croatian 
government ‘on the whole fulfils its promises given to Serbs’, although certain 
problems continued.37 These problems however have never seriously endangered the 
support of the SDSS to Sanader’s government.  
 
Marginalisation of the Tudjmanists within the HDZ, coalition with the Serbs, an 
improving relationship with Serbia and Montenegro – as well as co-operation with the 
international community in its policy towards Bosnia-Herzegovina – erased the initial 
scepticism of the European Union about the new government. Croatia’s application 
for EU membership was further supported by the conclusions of the Thessaloniki 
summit of the European Council in June 2003, which confirmed that all countries of 
the Western Balkans – including Croatia – could look forward to the prospect of 
accession. The European Partnership with Croatia was the direct result of the 
Thessaloniki Agenda, and Croatia (then still under the Račan government) 
participated enthusiastically. But once the initial scepticism about the Sanader 
government was replaced with support, the EU Commission issued its Opinion on 
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Croatia’s Application for Membership of the EU.38 The Opinion concluded that 
Croatia was ‘a functioning democracy, with stable institutions, guaranteeing the rule 
of law and no major problems regarding the respect of fundamental rights’. It also 
confirmed that Croatia was ‘a functioning market economy’. The Opinion saw ‘no 
major difficulties in applying the acquis’ in  the fields of: economic and monetary 
union, statistics, industrial policy, small and medium sized enterprises, science and 
research, education and training, culture and audio-visual policy, external relations, 
common foreign and security policy, and financial and budgetary provisions. Further 
efforts were encouraged in the fields of free movement of capital, company law, 
fisheries, transport, energy, consumer and health protection, customs union and 
financial control. According to the Opinion, ‘considerable and sustained efforts’ were 
needed in areas of: free movement of goods, free movement of persons, freedom to 
provide services, competition, agriculture, taxation, social policy and employment, 
telecommunications and information technology, regional policy and justice and 
home affairs’. The only area where ‘very significant efforts’ were needed, was 
environment.  
 
Although the European Council decided in June 2004 that Croatia should be accorded 
the status of candidate country, it was pointed out that ‘Croatia needed to maintain full 
cooperation with ICTY and to take all necessary steps to ensure that the remaining 
indictee [i.e. general Gotovina, op.aut.] was located and transferred to The Hague’.39 
This requirement proved to be the most difficult, although public support for general 
Gotovina was now significantly lower than in 2001. Sanader’s government faced no 
serious threat from possible public protests, and – as events following the arrest of the 
general in December 2005 confirmed - no violence was likely to be used in the case 
that the general was arrested and extradited. However, the government claimed that it 
simply had no idea of his whereabouts. In Spring 2004, the Croatian government 
accepted the presence of foreign intelligence services in Croatia – including the 
British – whose objective was to locate Ante Gotovina. A special Action Plan was co-
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ordinated with the ICTY and the EU, aimed at detecting and breaking a net of support 
for the general among the former Tudjmanists. However, several documents from 
these secretive operations were soon leaked to national press, in a clear manifestation 
that Tudjmanists were still present (if no longer influential) in the state apparatus. In 
March 2005, Carla Del Ponte, the ICTY Chief Prosecutor, concluded that Croatia still 
needed to improve its co-operation with the ICTY. As a consequence, the European 
Council postponed the date of the accession talks with Croatia, until this requirement 
was met. However, a special three-member commission (Troika) was established to 
monitor further progress, in response to Croatian complaints that the ICTY should not 
determine the EU’s policy towards Croatia.  In somewhat controversial context of the 
stalemate on Turkey’s accession talks in October 2005, Del Ponte unexpectedly 
confirmed that Croatia was ‘as of last couple of weeks fully co-operating with the 
ICTY’. This effectively removed the last barrier to the beginning of accession talks. 
The decision of the Council to begin accession talks with Croatia followed 
immediately.  
 
This decision, however, was not only the result of a more direct co-operation with the 
ICTY, but also of Croatia’s successful lobbying within the EU, which was helped by a 
convenient set of circumstances. Since its independence in 1992, Croatian foreign 
policy aimed at building support among three different (although often overlapping) 
informal groups of European states. Firstly, Croatia relied on the support of Germany 
and – since Jacques Chirac became the President – France. Germany was the decisive 
force behind the recognition of Croatian independence back in December 1991. 
France became the principal supporter of further enlargement at the Zagreb meeting in 
2001, which was held during the French presidency. But by October 2005, both 
Germany and France faced domestic crises – Germany was in the process of forming 
a new government following elections, while France’s position in Europe was 
weakened by the outcome of the referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty. 
However, both countries supported the beginning of negotiations with Croatia, not 
least because Croatia refused to participate in the ‘coalition of the willing’ and it was 
critical of the war against Iraq. Croatia was also relying on support by a group of 
small states in Central Europe. The new, post-Tudjmanist Croatia accepted that it was 
a small state, not a ‘regional power’. As such, it successfully sought support from 
other Central European small nations – for example Austria, Slovakia, Slovenia, and 
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even  the Czech Republic (despite occasional disagreements between Prague and 
Zagreb), and the three Baltic States: Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.40 Finally, Croatia 
successfully lobbied in the Vatican, through which it influenced a number of 
important predominantly Catholic countries in Europe – for example, Poland, Italy 
and Ireland. The importance of the Catholic church and its support in the process of 
EU accession was acknowledged by the Prime Minister Sanader who thanked 
Cardinal Bozanić, the Archibishop of Zagreb, saying that ‘without the support of the 
Catholic church, this decision (on beginning of accession talks) would not have 
happened’.41 Major political parties – both on the left (SDP) and the right (HDZ) 
lobbied for support through European political party associations, with significant 
success.42 The SDSS sent several letters to EU and individual governments (including 
to Tony Blair, on 1 September 2005) encouraging them to support Croatia.  
 
Unlike Tudjman’s foreign policy – which in the second half of the 1990s became 
increasingly isolationist, leaving Croatia with no friends in Europe – the new 
orientation helped Croatia to built links within the Europe. The Austrian quid pro quo 
position meant that Austria would agree to beginning accession talks with Turkey 
only if and when Croatia was promised the same.43 It worked. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Croatian public opinion reacted with great enthusiasm to the announcement that there 
would finally be accession talks. Opinion polls conducted in the immediate aftermath 
of 4 October 2005 showed that support for Croatian membership in the European 
Union increased by almost 17 percent – from a very low point of 33 percent in 
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September44 to 49.6 per cent  on 5 October45. This is not surprising. In the aftermath 
of 4 October, the EU was no longer seen as unfair towards Croatia, and no longer the 
supervisor, tutor and punisher. This might yet change once the talks are under way, 
especially if the conditions were to be seen as too restrictive. But, it is unlikely that 
the public would turn anti-European now when no major political party remains to 
organise anti-European politics. In addition, the more open the Union becomes 
towards Croatia, the more enthusiastic will Croats be about joining the Union.  
 
Croatian politicians now emphasise that the good relationship they have with 
countries that entered the Union in 2004 would certainly help, as they were willing to 
help with their own experience in negotiations. The Chief negotiator, Vladimir 
Drobnjak, stated that the Slovakian experience would be particularly helpful, as this 
country went through negotiations rather quickly, having joined the accession talks at 
a later stage, due to political reasons.46 Croatia will try to take advantage of its 
smallness in terms of territory and population and will argue that it should be easy to 
‘absorb’ in the European Union as it has a fairly advanced economy and it is a sound 
and stable democracy.47 Politicians hope that the accession talks could be completed 
within the next two or three years. It would be nice, they say, if Croatian citizens 
could participate in the elections to the European parliament in 2009.  
 
This will, however, depend not only on Croatia – which is now seen as fully co-
operative with the ICTY - but also on circumstances beyond its (or perhaps anybody 
else’s) control. In particular, two of them will be very significant. Firstly, Croatian 
membership in the European Union depends on general state of the Union, which has 
not yet found a solution for the constitutional stalemate, and which also lacks unity 
with regard to further enlargements. Secondly, further progress will depend on 
resolving certain bilateral problems that Croatia has with two of its EU neighbours – 
                                                 
44
 According to a survey conducted by GfK, quoted by Novi List on 27 September 2005, only 33 
percent of Croatians supported membership of the EU, while 56 percent opposed it. Support for the EU 
was at its peak in June 2003, when 82 percent of respondents supported it. Accessible online on 23 
October 2005 at www.novilist.hr. 
45
 In the first ad hoc survey conducted in the immediate aftermath of decision on opening of the 
accession talks, only 25 percent were against the EU, with 24 per cent  undecided. Večernji List, 5 
October, accessible online on 23 October 2005 at www.vecernji-list.hr.  
46
 Interview with Vladimir Drobnjak, Slobodna Dalmacija, 17 October 2005. 
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Italy and Slovenia. This concerns compensations and status of the esuli, ethnic Italians 
from Istria and Dalmatia who were forced to leave their homes in the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War. The open issues with Slovenia are potentially 
more damaging, as they involve dispute over the maritime border in the Bay of Piran, 
and compensation for savings of Croatian nationals that were frozen by the 
Ljubljanska Banka during the break-up of former Yugoslavia. As all members of the 
European Union will have to consent to Croatia’s membership, these issues will have 
to be resolved during the accession talks.48  
 
But, the accession talks are now already transforming Croatia into a ‘normal’, 
democratic European country, taking it away from the authoritarianism and 
nationalism of the 1990s. Membership of the Union, if and when it happens, will be 
the final act of this ‘complete transformation of society’, the ultimate recognition that 
the second transition is over. Macedonia, Albania, Serbia and Montenegro (whether as 
one state or two), and Bosnia and Herzegovina are likely to follow.  
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 Interview with Vladimir Drobnjak, ibid. This statement indicates that Croatia does not want to be 
treated as a part of a ‘package’ with Turkey, nor as a part of a ‘regional approach’, i.e. in the same 
block with other countries of the ‘Western Balkans’.  
48
 In October 2005, Croatia proposed that the border dispute with Slovenia is dealt with via 
international arbitration, but Slovenia refused, and proposed that these issues should become part of the 
accession talks. Slovenia hopes that as a member-state of the Union it might be in an advantageous 
position if the talks are held within the framework of accession. In addition, the Slovenian Foreign 
Minister, Dimitrij Rupel, confirmed that a Slovenian referendum on Croatian membership was a 
possibility, if no solution for the Bay of Piran was achieved.  
